IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance利益相關(guān)者的角色

　　The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)將認(rèn)可法律和互相協(xié)商賦予利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)利，并且鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)和利益相關(guān)者在創(chuàng)造財(cái)富、工作機(jī)會(huì)和持續(xù)推動(dòng)企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)健康等方面積極合作。

　　A. The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are to be respected.

　　B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violations of their rights.

　　C. Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop.

　　D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis.

　　E. Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board and their rights should not be compromised for doing this.

　　F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor rights.

　　(1)通過(guò)法律和互相協(xié)議賦予利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)利受到尊重。

　　(2)利益相關(guān)者的利益受到法律的保護(hù)，在他們的權(quán)利受到損害時(shí)應(yīng)當(dāng)獲得有效補(bǔ)償?shù)臋C(jī)會(huì)。

　　(3)提高員工參與程度的機(jī)制應(yīng)當(dāng)被允許發(fā)展。

　　(4)在公司治理過(guò)程中利益相關(guān)者參與的地方，在及時(shí)和有規(guī)則的基礎(chǔ)上，他們應(yīng)該有渠道獲得恰當(dāng)?shù)?、充分的、可靠的信息?/span>

　　(5)利益相關(guān)者，包括個(gè)別員工和他們的代表，應(yīng)該能夠自由地交換他們關(guān)于對(duì)董事會(huì)違法和不道德行為的看法，在做這些時(shí)他們的權(quán)利不應(yīng)受到損害。

　　(6)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)當(dāng)被一個(gè)有效的破產(chǎn)機(jī)制和債權(quán)實(shí)施機(jī)制所補(bǔ)充。

　　V. Disclosure and Transparency信息披露和透明度

　　The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)該保證公司所有重大事件及時(shí)地、準(zhǔn)確地得到披露，包括財(cái)務(wù)狀況、業(yè)績(jī)、所有權(quán)和公司治理的情況。

　　A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on:

　　1. The financial and operating results of the company.

　　2. Company objectives.

　　3. Major share ownership and voting rights.

　　4. Remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives, and information about board members, including their qualifications, the selection process, other company directorships and whether they are regarded as independent by the board.

　　5. Related party transactions.

　　6. Foreseeable risk factors.

　　7. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders.

　　8. Governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented.

　　B. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure.

　　C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified, auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects.

　　D. External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit.

　　E. Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users.

　　F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis or advice by analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others, that is relevant to decisions by investors, free from material conflicts of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice.

　　(1)披露將包括、但不限制于以下重要信息：

　　i. 公司財(cái)務(wù)和業(yè)績(jī)狀況;

　　ii. 公司經(jīng)營(yíng)目標(biāo);

　　iii. 主要股權(quán)和投票權(quán);

　　iv. 對(duì)董事會(huì)成員和關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)人員的薪酬政策，和董事會(huì)成員的信息，包括他們的資格、選擇程序、在其他公司兼任董事情況以及他們是否被董事會(huì)確認(rèn)為獨(dú)立董事;

　　v. 關(guān)聯(lián)交易;

　　vi. 可預(yù)期的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素;

　　vii. 關(guān)于員工和其他利益相關(guān)者的問(wèn)題。

　　viii. 治理結(jié)構(gòu)和政策，包括公司治理規(guī)范或政策的詳細(xì)內(nèi)容，以及它們實(shí)施的程序。

　　(2)信息應(yīng)該按照高質(zhì)量的會(huì)計(jì)、財(cái)務(wù)和非財(cái)務(wù)公告的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制作和披露。

　　(3)年度審計(jì)報(bào)告應(yīng)當(dāng)由獨(dú)立的、有能力的、有資格的審計(jì)師制作，以便給董事會(huì)和股東提供一個(gè)外部的客觀的保證，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告應(yīng)在尊重事實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)上公正地描繪公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況和業(yè)績(jī)。

　　(4)外部審計(jì)師應(yīng)對(duì)股東負(fù)責(zé)，并對(duì)公司負(fù)有義務(wù)，在審計(jì)中具備專業(yè)審慎的素養(yǎng)。

　　(5)信息傳播的途徑應(yīng)確保信息使用者能夠平等、及時(shí)、便捷地獲取信息。

　　(6)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)當(dāng)被一個(gè)有效的方法所補(bǔ)充，這就是提供和推廣分析報(bào)告、或者由分析員、經(jīng)紀(jì)人、評(píng)估中介等提供建議。由于這些分析報(bào)告和建議關(guān)系到投資者的決策，因此在其中不應(yīng)該出現(xiàn)有損于其公正性的重大利益沖突。

　　VII. The Responsible of the Board董事會(huì)的責(zé)任

　　The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.

　　A. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders.

　　B. Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, the board should treat all shareholders fairly.

　　C. The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account the interests of stakeholders.

　　D. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including:

　　1. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures.

　　2. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and making change as needed.

　　3. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning.

　　4. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders.

　　5. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process.

　　6. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board members and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions.

　　7. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.

　　8. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications.

　　E. The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on corporate affairs.

　　1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, and board remuneration.

　　2. When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board.

　　3. Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities.

　　F. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, relevant and timely information.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)確保董事會(huì)對(duì)公司的戰(zhàn)略指導(dǎo)和對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層的有效監(jiān)督,同時(shí)確保董事會(huì)對(duì)公司和股東的責(zé)任和忠誠(chéng)。

　　(1)董事會(huì)成員的行為應(yīng)當(dāng)建立在一個(gè)充分可靠信息的基礎(chǔ)上，忠實(shí)誠(chéng)信、勤勉盡責(zé)、根據(jù)公司和股東的最大利益履行職責(zé)。

　　(2)如果董事會(huì)的決策可能對(duì)不同的股東團(tuán)體產(chǎn)生不同影響，董事會(huì)應(yīng)該平等地對(duì)待所有股東。

　　(3)董事會(huì)應(yīng)該具有很高的倫理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。它應(yīng)當(dāng)充分考慮到利益相關(guān)者的利益。

　　(4)董事會(huì)應(yīng)該履行以下一些關(guān)鍵職能：

　　i. 審查和指導(dǎo)制定公司戰(zhàn)略、重要的行動(dòng)計(jì)劃、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)策、年度預(yù)算和商業(yè)計(jì)劃、制定績(jī)效目標(biāo)、監(jiān)督目標(biāo)的執(zhí)行和企業(yè)績(jī)效的實(shí)現(xiàn)、監(jiān)督重要的資金支出、收購(gòu)和出售等行為。

　　ii. 監(jiān)控公司的治理實(shí)踐成效，在需要的時(shí)候加以方向上的干預(yù)。

　　iii. 選擇、確定報(bào)酬、監(jiān)控關(guān)鍵的經(jīng)營(yíng)主管人員，在必要的時(shí)候、更換關(guān)鍵的經(jīng)營(yíng)主管人員;監(jiān)督更替計(jì)劃。

　　iv. 協(xié)調(diào)關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)主管人員和董事會(huì)的薪酬，使之與公司和股東長(zhǎng)期利益保持一致。

　　v. 保證董事會(huì)的選聘和任命過(guò)程的正規(guī)化、透明性。

　　vi. 監(jiān)管經(jīng)營(yíng)層、董事會(huì)成員和股東之間的潛在的利益沖突，這包括公司財(cái)產(chǎn)的濫用和關(guān)聯(lián)交易中的舞弊行為

　　vii.確保公司的會(huì)計(jì)、財(cái)務(wù)(包括獨(dú)立的審計(jì))報(bào)告的真實(shí)性，確保恰當(dāng)?shù)目刂葡到y(tǒng)到位，特別是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理系統(tǒng)、財(cái)務(wù)和運(yùn)作控制，確保按照法律和相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)執(zhí)行。

　　viii督信息披露和對(duì)外溝通的過(guò)程。

　　(5)董事會(huì)對(duì)公司事務(wù)，應(yīng)該能夠行使客觀獨(dú)立的判斷。

　　i. 董事會(huì)應(yīng)該考慮指派足夠數(shù)量的、有能力的非執(zhí)行董事，對(duì)潛在的利益沖突的事項(xiàng)行使客觀獨(dú)立判斷的任務(wù)。這些關(guān)鍵的責(zé)任例子是確保財(cái)務(wù)和非財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的完整性、審核關(guān)聯(lián)交易、任命董事會(huì)成員、確定關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營(yíng)主管人員和董事會(huì)的報(bào)酬等。

　　ii. 當(dāng)董事會(huì)專業(yè)委員會(huì)設(shè)立時(shí)，他們的任命、構(gòu)成和工作程序應(yīng)該定義明確并由董事會(huì)公告。

　　iii.董事會(huì)成員應(yīng)該承諾有效地履行他們的職責(zé)。

　　(6)為了履行他們的職責(zé)，董事會(huì)成員應(yīng)該有渠道掌握準(zhǔn)確的、關(guān)鍵、及時(shí)的信息。

　　Part Two nnotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

　　第二部分：OECD公司治理準(zhǔn)則注解

　　I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework

　　有效的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)所要確保的基礎(chǔ)

　　The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.

　　To ensure an effective corporate governance framework, it is necessary that an appropriate and effective legal, regulatory and institutional foundation is established upon which all market participants can rely in establishing their private contractual relations. This corporate governance framework typically comprises elements of legislation, regulation, self-regulatory arrangements, voluntary commitments and business practices that are the result of a country’s specific circumstances, history and tradition. The desirable mix between legislation, regulation, self-regulation, voluntary standards, etc. in area will therefore vary from country to country. As new experiences accrue and business circumstances change, the content and structure of this framework might need to be adjusted.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)將促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)的透明化和高效率，并對(duì)法律的規(guī)范，以及監(jiān)管權(quán)、制定規(guī)則權(quán)和執(zhí)行權(quán)各自責(zé)任的明確界定之間進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)。

　　一個(gè)有效的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)所要確保的必要條件是：所有市場(chǎng)參與者在建立他們私人的契約關(guān)系時(shí)都是可信賴的，適當(dāng)和有效的法律、規(guī)章和制度都構(gòu)筑于這個(gè)基礎(chǔ)之上。一個(gè)典型的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)包括法律的基本原理、規(guī)章制度、自律機(jī)制、主動(dòng)的承諾，以及由一個(gè)國(guó)家特殊的環(huán)境、歷史和傳統(tǒng)形成的商業(yè)習(xí)慣。這些法律、規(guī)章、自律、自發(fā)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等等，它們之間理想化的融合，在這個(gè)領(lǐng)域里將因不同的國(guó)家產(chǎn)生不同的變化。當(dāng)新的經(jīng)驗(yàn)的積累增長(zhǎng)和商業(yè)環(huán)境的變化遷移，這個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)的內(nèi)容和構(gòu)造就可能需要被調(diào)整。

　　Countries seeking to implement the Principles should monitor their corporate governance framework, including regulatory and listing requirements and business practices, with the objective of maintaining and strengthening its contribution to market integrity and economic performance. As part of this, it is important to take into account the interactions and complementarity between different elements of the corporate governance framework and its overall ability to promote ethical, responsible and transparent corporate governance practices. Such analysis should be viewed as an important tool in the process of developing an effective corporate governance framework. To this end, effective and continuous consultation with the public is an essential element that is widely regarded as good practice. Moreover, in developing a corporate governance framework in each jurisdiction, national legislators and regulators should duly consider the need for, and the results from, effective international dialogue and cooperation. If these conditions are met, the governance system is more likely to avoid over-regulation, support the exercise of entrepreneurship and limit the risks of damaging conflicts of interest in both the private sector and in public institutions.

　　尋求履行本準(zhǔn)則的國(guó)家，應(yīng)當(dāng)帶著以下的目標(biāo)來(lái)監(jiān)控他們的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，包括規(guī)章、上市條件及商業(yè)習(xí)慣等，這目標(biāo)就是保持和鞏固它對(duì)市場(chǎng)誠(chéng)信及經(jīng)濟(jì)效能的貢獻(xiàn)。作為其中的一部分，考慮到不同的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的基本原則和它對(duì)于促進(jìn)公司治理實(shí)踐的道德倫理、責(zé)任感和透明性的全面作用之間的相互作用和補(bǔ)充，這是十分重要的。在形成一個(gè)有效的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中，這樣的分析應(yīng)當(dāng)被看作是一個(gè)重要的工具。最后，有效的和持續(xù)的公開協(xié)商成為一個(gè)基本的要素、被廣泛地認(rèn)可為良好的做法。此外，在各個(gè)地方形成的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，國(guó)家的立法者和監(jiān)管者應(yīng)該充分地考慮到國(guó)際對(duì)話與合作的需要和結(jié)果。如果遇到這些情形，治理系統(tǒng)就可能避免過(guò)度管制、支持企業(yè)家能力的運(yùn)用和減少公共機(jī)構(gòu)和私人部門利益沖突損害的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

　　A. The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view to its impact on overall economic performance, market integrity and the incentives it creates for market participants and the performance of transparent and efficient markets.

　　The corporate form of organisation of economic activity is a powerful force for growth. The regulatory and legal environment within which corporations operate is therefore of key importance to overall economic outcomes. Policy makers have a responsibility to put in place a framework that is flexible enough to meet the needs of corporations operating in widely different circumstances, facilitating their development of new opportunities to create value and to determine the most efficient deployment of resources. To achieve this goal, policy makers should remain focused on ultimate economic outcomes and when considering policy options, they will need to undertake an analysis of the impact on key variables that affect the functioning of markets, such as incentive structures, the efficiency of self-regulatory systems and dealing with systemic conflicts of interest. Transparent and efficient markets serve to discipline market participants and to promote accountability.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)將隨著這樣一個(gè)觀念而發(fā)展：它的影響波及整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)的成效和市場(chǎng)的完善，促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)參與者提高市場(chǎng)的透明度和效率。

　　作為經(jīng)濟(jì)行為的組織形式的公司，它是增長(zhǎng)的一個(gè)強(qiáng)大推動(dòng)力。因此，企業(yè)運(yùn)作的內(nèi)部規(guī)章和法律環(huán)境是全部經(jīng)濟(jì)成果的重要關(guān)鍵。政策制定者有責(zé)任把一個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)置于適當(dāng)?shù)奈恢茫@個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)必須靈活得足以應(yīng)對(duì)廣泛的不同環(huán)境的企業(yè)運(yùn)作的需要，推動(dòng)它們發(fā)展新的機(jī)會(huì)去創(chuàng)造價(jià)值并確定最有效地使用資源。要達(dá)到這些目標(biāo)，政策制定者應(yīng)該充分關(guān)注經(jīng)濟(jì)的最終成果，并且在考慮政策的選擇時(shí)，他們將需要對(duì)影響市場(chǎng)機(jī)能的關(guān)鍵的可變量進(jìn)行效果分析，比如激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)、自律系統(tǒng)的效率和系統(tǒng)利益沖突的交易。透明有效的市場(chǎng)有利于鍛煉市場(chǎng)參與者并提升責(zé)任性。

　　B. The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance practices in a jurisdiction should be consistent with the rule of law, transparent and enforceable.

　　If new laws and regulations are needed, such as to deal with clear cases of market imperfections, they should be designed in a way that makes them possible to implement and enforce in an efficient and even handed manner covering all parties. Consultation by government and other regulatory authorities with corporations, their representative organisations and other stakeholders, is an effective way of doing this. Mechanisms should also be established for parties to protect their rights. In order to avoid over-regulation, unenforceable laws, and unintended consequences that may impede or distort business dynamics, policy measures should be designed with a view to their overall costs and benefits. Such assessments should take into account the need for effective enforcement, including the ability of authorities to deter dishonest behaviour and to impose effective sanctions for violations.

　　Corporate governance objectives are also formulated in voluntary codes and standards that do not have the status of law or regulation. While such codes play an important rule in improving corporate governance arrangements, they might leave shareholders and other stakeholders with uncertainty concerning their status and implementation. When codes and principles are used as a national standard or as an explicit substitute for legal or regulatory provisions, market credibility requires that their status in terms of coverage, implementation, compliance and sanctions is clearly specified.

　　在一定的范圍內(nèi)影響到公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)實(shí)踐的法律和規(guī)章要求，應(yīng)當(dāng)在法律規(guī)定、透明度、可操作性上協(xié)調(diào)一致。

　　如果新的法律和規(guī)章是必需的，比如對(duì)于明顯不完整市場(chǎng)的案例，它們應(yīng)該被設(shè)計(jì)成一個(gè)針對(duì)所有的團(tuán)體的有效的強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行的方式，甚至是高壓手段。向政府和其他企業(yè)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、它們的組織代表和其他利益相關(guān)者請(qǐng)教，是做這事的一個(gè)有效方法。也應(yīng)該建立保護(hù)不同團(tuán)體權(quán)力的機(jī)制。為了避免超越規(guī)則的不能執(zhí)行的法律和可能妨礙、扭曲市場(chǎng)動(dòng)力的無(wú)意結(jié)果，政策措施應(yīng)該帶著針對(duì)全部成本和收益的觀念來(lái)設(shè)計(jì)。對(duì)于有效的強(qiáng)制，這樣的估計(jì)應(yīng)該考慮是必需的，包括阻止不誠(chéng)實(shí)的行為和對(duì)于違反者采用有效的處罰等等的權(quán)威能力。

　　公司治理的目標(biāo)也被自愿的規(guī)范和不帶有法律規(guī)章性質(zhì)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)闡明。當(dāng)這樣的規(guī)范在改善公司治理安排中扮演一個(gè)重要角色時(shí)，它們可能使得股東和其他利益相關(guān)者對(duì)于它們的身份地位和執(zhí)行產(chǎn)生懷疑。 當(dāng)規(guī)范和準(zhǔn)則被用作一個(gè)國(guó)家性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、或如一個(gè)法律規(guī)章條款的明確的替代品時(shí)，諸如細(xì)則范圍的法律地位、執(zhí)行、遵守和處罰等有關(guān)市場(chǎng)信譽(yù)的要求應(yīng)該被明確指定說(shuō)明。

　　C. The division of responsibilities among different authorities in a jurisdiction should be clearly articulated and ensure that the public interest is served.

　　Corporate governance requirements and practices are typically influenced by an array of legal domains, such as company law, securities regulation, accounting and auditing standards, insolvency law, contract law, labour law and tax law. Under these circumstances, there is a risk that the variety of legal influences may cause unintentional overlaps and even conflicts, which may frustrate the ability to pursue key corporate governance objectives. It is important that policy-makers are aware of this risk and take measures to limit it. Effective enforcement also requires that the allocation of responsibilities for supervision, implementation and enforcement among different authorities is clearly defined so that the competencies of complementary bodies and agencies are respected and used most effectively. Overlapping and perhaps contradictory regulations between national jurisdictions is also an issue that should be monitored so that no regulatory vacuum is allowed to develop (i.e. issues slipping through in which no authority has explicit responsibility) and to minimize the cost of compliance with multiple systems by corporations.

　　When regulatory responsibilities or oversight are delegated to non-public bodies, it is desirable to explicitly assess why, and under what circumstances, such delegation is desirable. It is also essential that the governance structure of any such delegated institution be transparent and encompass the public interest.

　　在一定范圍內(nèi)劃分不同職權(quán)的責(zé)任，應(yīng)該是明確無(wú)誤的、并確保公眾利益的實(shí)現(xiàn)。

　　公司治理的要求和實(shí)踐，受到一系列法律的明顯影響，這包括公司法、證券規(guī)章、會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、破產(chǎn)法、合同法、勞工法、以及稅法等。在這樣的環(huán)境下，法律變化的影響可能招致無(wú)意識(shí)的重疊、甚至是沖突，這樣的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能阻礙對(duì)于公司治理的關(guān)鍵目標(biāo)的推進(jìn)。政策制定者意識(shí)到這樣的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和采取措施去防止它，這將是非常重要的。有效的執(zhí)行需要在不同的部門中劃分監(jiān)控、實(shí)施和執(zhí)行的責(zé)任，而這種劃分必須是被清楚地定義的，這樣才能使得有相互補(bǔ)充資格的機(jī)關(guān)和機(jī)構(gòu)得到尊重并提供更高的效率。在國(guó)家的法規(guī)權(quán)限之間，重疊和可能矛盾的規(guī)章也是一個(gè)應(yīng)該被關(guān)注的問(wèn)題，這樣才沒(méi)有規(guī)章的真空被利用(例如在沒(méi)有權(quán)限賦予明確的責(zé)任中造成的疏漏問(wèn)題)，以及對(duì)多重系統(tǒng)服從的成本被忽視。

　　當(dāng)制定規(guī)則的責(zé)任和監(jiān)督被授權(quán)給不公開的主體時(shí)，它需要明確地評(píng)估為什么、以及在什么環(huán)境下這樣的授權(quán)是適當(dāng)?shù)?對(duì)于所有這樣透明的被授權(quán)機(jī)構(gòu)和包含公共利益的治理結(jié)構(gòu)來(lái)說(shuō)，這也是最基本的。

　　D. Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the authority, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and objective manner. Moreover, their rulings should be timely, transparent and fully explained.

　　Regulatory responsibilities should be vested with bodies that can pursue their functions without conflicts of interest and that are subject to judicial review. As the number of public companies, corporate events and the volume of disclosures increase, the resources of supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities may come under strain. As a result, in order to follow developments, they will have a significant demand for fully qualified staff to provide effective oversight and investigative capacity which will need to be appropriately funded. The ability to attract staff on competitive terms will enhance the quality and independence of supervision and enforcement.

　　監(jiān)管的、制定規(guī)則的、實(shí)施操作的職權(quán)，應(yīng)當(dāng)具有各自的權(quán)威、完整性和資源，以便用專業(yè)化和客觀的方式來(lái)完成他們各自的職責(zé)。而且它們之間的劃分應(yīng)該是及時(shí)的、透明的和有充分說(shuō)明的。

　　制定規(guī)則的責(zé)任應(yīng)當(dāng)被授予那些能夠不帶利益沖突地行使他們職能、服從公正判斷的主體。對(duì)于越來(lái)越多的公眾公司、企業(yè)實(shí)踐和披露增長(zhǎng)的數(shù)量來(lái)講，監(jiān)管、制定規(guī)則和執(zhí)行部門的資源可能變得緊張。結(jié)果就是，為了跟上發(fā)展，他們將需要完全有資格的員工提供有效的監(jiān)控，并為這些員工提供適當(dāng)?shù)恼{(diào)查研究地位。這種把員工吸引到競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系上來(lái)的能力將增強(qiáng)監(jiān)督和執(zhí)行的質(zhì)量與獨(dú)立性。

　　II. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions股東的權(quán)利和所有權(quán)作用的關(guān)鍵

　　The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights.

　　Equity investors have certain property rights. For example, an equity share in a publicly traded company can be bought, sold, or transferred. An equity share also entitles the investor to participate in the profits of the corporation, with liability limited to the amount of the investment. In addition, ownership of an equity share provides a right to information about the corporation and a right to influence the corporation, primarily by participation in general shareholder meetings and by voting.

　　As a practical matter, however, the corporation cannot be managed by shareholder referendum. The shareholding body is made up of individuals and institutions whose interests, goals, investment horizons and capabilities vary. Moreover, the corporation’s management must be able to take business decisions rapidly. In light of these realities and the complexity of managing the corporation’s affairs in fast moving and ever changing markets, shareholders are not expected to assume responsibility for managing corporate activities. The responsibility for corporate strategy and operations is typically placed in the hands of the board and a management team that is selected, motivated and, when necessary, replaced by the board.

　　Shareholders’ rights to influence to the corporation centre on certain fundamental issues, such as the election of board members, or other means of influencing the composition of the board, amendments to the company’s organic documents, approval of extraordinary transactions, and other basic issues as specified in company law and internal company statutes. This Section can be seen as a statement of the most basic rights of shareholders, which are recognized by law in virtually all OECD countries. Additional rights such as the approval or election of auditors, direct nomination of board members, the ability to pledge shares, the approval of distributions of profits, etc., can be found in various jurisdictions.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)當(dāng)保護(hù)和促進(jìn)股東權(quán)利的行使

　　股權(quán)投資者具有當(dāng)然的所有者權(quán)利。比如，在一個(gè)公眾公司的一股股票可以被買進(jìn)、賣出或轉(zhuǎn)讓。一股股票也賦予投資者根據(jù)投資數(shù)量的有限責(zé)任而能夠參與企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)分享。另外，一個(gè)股份的所有權(quán)提供了對(duì)于企業(yè)的知情權(quán)和對(duì)企業(yè)的影響權(quán)，而首先是參加股東大會(huì)和投票的權(quán)力。

　　在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，企業(yè)無(wú)論如何不可能由股東投票來(lái)管理。股東是由利益、目標(biāo)、投資水平和能力不同的個(gè)人和機(jī)構(gòu)組成的。而企業(yè)的管理必須能夠迅速地作出經(jīng)營(yíng)決定。有鑒于在迅速變動(dòng)和轉(zhuǎn)換的市場(chǎng)中公司事務(wù)的復(fù)雜性和現(xiàn)實(shí)性，股東不可能期望承擔(dān)起管理企業(yè)行為的責(zé)任。企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略和運(yùn)作的責(zé)任明顯地落在董事會(huì)和一個(gè)由董事會(huì)選擇、推動(dòng)、在必要時(shí)由董事會(huì)替換的管理團(tuán)隊(duì)身上。

　　股東影響公司的權(quán)力集中在一些基本的問(wèn)題上，比如選擇董事會(huì)成員、或其他影響公司董事會(huì)組成的方法、修改公司的組織文件、批準(zhǔn)特別的交易，以及其他基本的問(wèn)題如說(shuō)明公司的規(guī)章和內(nèi)部條律。這些部分可以看成是大多數(shù)股東基本權(quán)利的一個(gè)描述，事實(shí)上在所有OECD成員國(guó)家這些都是被法律所承認(rèn)的。另外像選擇和批準(zhǔn)審計(jì)師、直接任命董事會(huì)成員、抵押股份的能力、批準(zhǔn)利潤(rùn)分配方案等的權(quán)力，在不同的權(quán)限內(nèi)也能夠被確立。

　　A. Basic shareholder rights should include the right to: 1) secure methods of ownership registration; 2) convey or transfer shares; 3) obtain relevant and material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; 4) participate and vote in general shareholder meetings; 5) elect and remove members of the board; and 6) share in the profits of the corporations.

　　基本的股東權(quán)利應(yīng)該包括以下幾個(gè)方面：①所有權(quán)注冊(cè)的安全方法;②轉(zhuǎn)讓和交易股票;③及時(shí)、定期地從企業(yè)得到相關(guān)和真實(shí)的信息資料;④參加股東大會(huì)和參與投票表決;⑤選舉和撤換董事會(huì)成員;⑥分享企業(yè)利潤(rùn)。

　　B. Shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: 1) amendments to the statutes, or articles of incorporation or similar governing documents of the company; 2) the authorization of additional shares; and 3) extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company.

　　The ability of companies to form partnerships and related companies and to transfer operational assets, cash flow rights and other rights and obligations to them is important for business flexibility and for delegating accountability in complex organisations. It also allows a company to divest itself of operational assets and to become only a holding company. However, without appropriate checks and balances such possibilities may also be abused.

　　股東應(yīng)該具有參與權(quán)、充分告知權(quán)、有關(guān)企業(yè)重大改變的決策權(quán)。這些重大改變包括：①修改法規(guī)、公司章程、其他類似的公司管理文件;②授權(quán)增發(fā)股份;③特別交易，包括轉(zhuǎn)讓全部或大部分資產(chǎn)、而這將造成公司被出售的結(jié)果。

　　公司組建合伙公司和關(guān)聯(lián)公司、轉(zhuǎn)讓運(yùn)作資產(chǎn)的能力，在聯(lián)合機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)，對(duì)于經(jīng)營(yíng)的靈活性和委托的責(zé)任性來(lái)講，現(xiàn)金流動(dòng)權(quán)和其他權(quán)利及責(zé)任對(duì)它們來(lái)講是很重要的。它也允許一個(gè)公司擺脫運(yùn)營(yíng)資產(chǎn)并變成一個(gè)控股公司，可是如果沒(méi)有適當(dāng)?shù)臋z查和平衡，這種權(quán)力也可能會(huì)被濫用。

　　C. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in genera shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder meetings:

　　1. Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely information concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well as full and timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the meeting.

　　2. Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the board, including questions relating to the annual external audit, to place items on the agenda of general meetings, and to propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations.

　　股東應(yīng)具備有效的參與機(jī)會(huì)、能夠在股東大會(huì)上投票、應(yīng)當(dāng)被告知投票規(guī)則包括投票程序，這將決定股東大會(huì)的正常舉行。

　　i. 股東應(yīng)當(dāng)及時(shí)收到關(guān)于股東大會(huì)舉行的日期、地點(diǎn)、議程等充分的信息，也包括關(guān)于會(huì)議決定的事項(xiàng)的充分及時(shí)的信息。

　　ii. 股東應(yīng)當(dāng)有機(jī)會(huì)對(duì)董事會(huì)提出問(wèn)題，包括對(duì)于年度審計(jì)報(bào)告、在股東大會(huì)議程中增加項(xiàng)目、對(duì)提議的決議案、對(duì)于適當(dāng)?shù)南拗茥l件等問(wèn)題。

　　In order to encourage shareholder participate in general meetings, some companies have improved the ability of shareholders to place items on the agenda by simplifying the process of filing amendments and resolutions. Improvements have also been made in order to make it easier for shareholders to submit questions in advance of the general meeting and to obtain replies from management and board members. Shareholders should also be able to ask questions relating to the external audit report. Companies are justified in assuring that abuses of such opportunities do not occur. It is reasonable, for example, to require that in order for shareholder resolutions to be placed on the agenda, they need to be supported by shareholders holding a specified market value or percentage of shares or voting rights. This threshold should be determined taking into account the degree of ownership concentration, in order to ensure that minority shareholders are not effectively prevented from putting any items on the agenda. Shareholder resolutions that are approved and fall within the competence of the shareholders’ meeting should be addressed by the board.

　　為了在股東大會(huì)上鼓勵(lì)股東參與，一些公司用文件修正案和決議案的簡(jiǎn)單程序增進(jìn)了股東在議程中提出條款的能力。改進(jìn)也使得股東在股東大會(huì)前提出疑問(wèn)并得到經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層和董事會(huì)成員的回復(fù)變得更容易。股東也應(yīng)該能夠?qū)ν獠康膶徲?jì)報(bào)告提出質(zhì)詢。公司可以對(duì)保證不出現(xiàn)權(quán)力濫用的可能為自己辯解。如果對(duì)股東在議程中提出的決議，他們要求股東持有一個(gè)指定的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值、或股份比例、或投票權(quán)的支持，這將是合理的。

　　這個(gè)最低限度取決于所有權(quán)的集中程度，這個(gè)程度能保證小股東在議程中提出任何條款不被有效地阻止。已批準(zhǔn)的、在股東大會(huì)能力范圍內(nèi)的股東決議案應(yīng)當(dāng)交由董事會(huì)處理。

　　3. Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions, such as the nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated. Shareholders should be able to make their views known on the remuneration policy for board members and key executives. The equity component of compensation schemes for board members and employees should be subject to shareholder approval.

　　To elect the members of the board is a basic shareholder right. For the election process to be effective, shareholders should be able to participate in the nomination of board members and vote on individual nominees or on different lists of them. To this end, shareholders have access in a number of countries to the company’s proxy materials which are sent to shareholders, although sometimes subject to conditions to prevent abuse. With respect to nomination of candidates, boards in many companies have established nomination committees to ensure proper compliance with established nomination procedures and to facilitate and coordinate the search for a balanced and qualified board. It is increasingly regarded as good practice in many countries for independent board members to have a key role on this committee. To further improve the selection process, the Principles also call for full disclosure of the experience and background of candidates for the board and the nomination process, which will allow an informed assessment of the abilities and suitability of each candidate.

　　在公司治理決策的關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)上，例如選舉和任命董事會(huì)成員，有效的股東參與應(yīng)該被推進(jìn)。在董事會(huì)成員和關(guān)鍵經(jīng)理人員的薪酬政策上，股東應(yīng)該能夠使得他們的觀點(diǎn)被大家知道。對(duì)董事會(huì)成員和員工的報(bào)酬安排的公正程度應(yīng)當(dāng)是股東核準(zhǔn)的前提。

　　選舉董事會(huì)成員是股東的基本權(quán)利之一。為了選舉程序的有效性，股東應(yīng)該能夠參與董事會(huì)成員的提名過(guò)程，對(duì)于個(gè)別被提名者或不同的其他提名者進(jìn)行投票。盡管有時(shí)候以防止濫用為先決條件，但最終，在許多國(guó)家股東具有獲得公司發(fā)送給股東的委托代理材料的權(quán)力。說(shuō)到候選人提名，許多國(guó)家的董事會(huì)已經(jīng)設(shè)立了提名委員會(huì)以保證正確地遵守確定的提名程序，以便協(xié)調(diào)尋找到一個(gè)和諧與合格的董事會(huì)。在這個(gè)委員會(huì)里，獨(dú)立董事具有關(guān)鍵的作用，這在許多國(guó)家里日益被關(guān)注。選擇過(guò)程的進(jìn)一步改進(jìn)，本準(zhǔn)則也要求為董事會(huì)和提名程序詳盡披露候選人的經(jīng)歷和背景，這將為每一個(gè)候選人提供一個(gè)能力和適宜性的有信息內(nèi)容的評(píng)估。

　　The Principles call for the disclosure of remuneration policy by the board. In particular, it is important for shareholders to know the specific link between remuneration and company performance when they assess the capability of the board and the qualities they should seek in nominees for the board. Although board and executive contracts are not an appropriate subject for approval by the general meeting of shareholders, there should be a means by which they can express their views. Several countries have introduced an advisory vote which conveys the strength and tone of shareholder sentiment to the board without endangering employment contracts. In the case of equity-based schemes, their potential to dilute shareholders’ capital and to powerfully determine managerial incentives means that they should be approved by shareholders, either for individuals or for the policy of the scheme as a whole. In an increasing number of jurisdictions, any material changes to existing schemes must also be approved.

　　本準(zhǔn)則要求公開董事會(huì)的薪酬政策。特別是，讓股東了解公司業(yè)績(jī)和薪酬之間關(guān)系的細(xì)節(jié)是很重要的，當(dāng)他們?cè)u(píng)估董事會(huì)的能力和品質(zhì)時(shí)，他們應(yīng)該為董事會(huì)尋找候選人。董事會(huì)和經(jīng)營(yíng)層的契約由股東大會(huì)批準(zhǔn)并不十分適當(dāng)，但使得股東能夠把他們的觀點(diǎn)表達(dá)出來(lái)卻是不錯(cuò)的方法。一些國(guó)家引進(jìn)了選舉顧問(wèn)，他在不危及雇用合同的前提下將表達(dá)股東情緒的聲音和力量轉(zhuǎn)達(dá)給董事會(huì)。在公平基準(zhǔn)方案中，對(duì)于不是為個(gè)人就是為全體的政策安排，董事會(huì)的潛在地位稀釋了股東的資本力量、并有強(qiáng)有力地決定了經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層的激勵(lì)手段，而這些手段原本是應(yīng)該由股東所批準(zhǔn)的。在權(quán)限范圍逐漸增長(zhǎng)中，對(duì)現(xiàn)有安排的任何重大改變也必須得到批準(zhǔn)。

　　4. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal effect should be given to votes whether cast in person or in absentia.

　　The Principles recommend that voting by proxy be generally accepted. Indeed, it is important to the promotion and protection of shareholder rights that investors can place reliance upon directed proxy voting. The corporate governance framework should ensure that proxies are voted in accordance with the direction of the proxy holder and that disclosure is provided in relation to how undirected proxies will be voted. In those jurisdictions where companies are allowed to obtain proxies, it is important to disclose how the Chairperson of the meeting (as the usual recipient of shareholder proxies obtained by the company) will exercise the voting rights attaching to undirected proxies. Where proxies are held by the board or management for company pension funds and for employee stock ownership plans, the directions for voting should be disclosed.

　　The objective of facilitating shareholder participation suggests that companies consider favourably the enlarged use of information technology in voting, including secure electronic voting in absentia.

　　股東可以親自投票、也可以缺席投票，兩者都賦予投票結(jié)果以同等效力。

　　本準(zhǔn)則推薦一般公認(rèn)的代理投票。對(duì)于促進(jìn)和保護(hù)股東權(quán)利來(lái)說(shuō)，投資者能夠信賴定向代理投票確實(shí)是重要的。公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)當(dāng)保證，代理人的投票與被代理人的意向一致、并保證對(duì)如何進(jìn)行非定向代理投票做出公開的規(guī)定。在準(zhǔn)許獲得代理的這些公司權(quán)限內(nèi)，披露會(huì)議主席(如通常獲得公司股東代理委托的接收者)將如何實(shí)行附加的非直接代理投票權(quán)，這將是十分重要的。由公司董事會(huì)或經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層所掌握的公司養(yǎng)老基金和員工持股計(jì)劃的代理權(quán)，其投票意向應(yīng)該被披露。

　　促進(jìn)股東參與的目標(biāo)建議公司考慮在投票中如何更有利擴(kuò)大信息技術(shù)的使用，包括在缺席時(shí)采用的安全電子投票。

　　D. Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership should be disclosed.

　　Some capital structures allow a shareholder to exercise a degree of control over the corporation disproportionate to the shareholders’ equity ownership in the company. Pyramid structures, cross shareholdings and shares with limited or multiple voting rights can be used to diminish the capability of non-controlling shareholders to influence corporate policy.

　　In addition to ownership relations, other devices can affect control over the corporation. Shareholder agreements are a common means for groups of shareholders, who individually may hold relatively small shares of total equity, to act in concert so as to constitute an effective majority, or at least the largest single block of shareholders. Shareholder agreements usually give those participating in the agreements preferential rights to purchase shares if provisions that require those accepting the agreement not to sell their shares for a specified time. Shareholder agreements can cover issues such as how the board or the Chairman will be selected. The agreements can also oblige those in the agreements to vote as a block. Some countries have found it necessary to closely monitor such agreements and to limit their duration.

　　Voting caps limit the number of votes that a shareholder may cast, regardless of the number of shares the shareholder may actually possess. Voting caps therefore redistribute control and may affect the incentives for shareholder participation in shareholder meeting.

　　Given the capacity of these mechanisms to redistribute the influence of shareholder on company policy, shareholders can reasonably expect that all such capital structures and arrangements be disclosed.

　　使某些股東獲得與他們所有權(quán)不成比例的控制地位的資本結(jié)構(gòu)和安排，應(yīng)當(dāng)被披露。

　　有些資本結(jié)構(gòu)允許一個(gè)股東行使超過(guò)在公司的所有權(quán)比例的控制權(quán)。金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)、交叉持股、限制性股份或加倍投票權(quán)等等，都能夠用來(lái)減小非控股股東影響公司政策的能力。

　　除所有權(quán)關(guān)系外，其他策略也能夠影響對(duì)公司的控制權(quán)。股東協(xié)議是股東團(tuán)體常用的手段，個(gè)別股東可能只持有總股數(shù)中很少的股份，但一致的行動(dòng)會(huì)組成一個(gè)有效的多數(shù)、甚至在最后成為一個(gè)最大的單一團(tuán)體股東。股東協(xié)議通常給與他們的參與者以協(xié)議的優(yōu)先權(quán)，以便在協(xié)議的其他參與者想要出售他們的股份時(shí)，可以優(yōu)先購(gòu)買這些股份。這些協(xié)議也可以包括這樣的條款，要求這些接受協(xié)議的人為了一個(gè)指定的時(shí)段而暫時(shí)不出售他們的股份。股東協(xié)議能夠涵蓋如何選擇董事會(huì)和董事長(zhǎng)這樣的問(wèn)題。協(xié)議也能夠要求參與者集體投票。一些國(guó)家已經(jīng)建立一些機(jī)制，以便在必要時(shí)精確地監(jiān)控這些協(xié)議并限制它們的持續(xù)時(shí)間。

　　投票上限限制了股東投票的數(shù)量，而不管股東可能在實(shí)際上持有股份數(shù)量的多少。投票上限因而重新分配了對(duì)公司的控制權(quán)，并可能會(huì)影響股東參與股東大會(huì)的意愿。

　　由于這些機(jī)制具有重新分配股東影響公司政策的能力，股東有理由期望所有這些資本結(jié)構(gòu)和安排的信息被披露。

　　E. Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent manner.

　　1. The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in the capital markets, and extraordinary transactions such as mergers, and sales of substantial portions of corporate assets, should be clearly articulated and disclosed so that investors understand their rights and recourse. Transactions should occur at transparent prices and under fair conditions that protect the rights of all shareholders according to their class.

　　2. Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management and the board from accountability.

　　In some countries, companies employ anti-take-over devices. However, both investors and stock exchanges have expressed concern over the possibility that widespread use of anti-take-over devices may be a serious impediment to the functioning of the market for corporate control. In some instances, take-over defences can simply be devices to shield the management or board from shareholder monitoring. In implementing any anti-takeover devices and in dealing with take-over proposals, the fiduciary duty of the board to shareholders and the company must remain paramount.

　　公司控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)應(yīng)被允許以有效率和高透明的方式運(yùn)作。

　　i. 用來(lái)規(guī)范在資本市場(chǎng)上獲得公司控制權(quán)和非常規(guī)交易，如購(gòu)并、公司主要資產(chǎn)的出售等的規(guī)則和程序，應(yīng)該明確制定和披露，以便投資者理解他們的權(quán)利和追索權(quán)。交易應(yīng)該在透明的價(jià)格和公平的條件下進(jìn)行，以便所有股東依照他們的類別保護(hù)他們的權(quán)利。

　　ii. 反購(gòu)并機(jī)制不應(yīng)用于使經(jīng)營(yíng)層和董事會(huì)免受監(jiān)督。

　　在一些國(guó)家，有公司采用反購(gòu)并機(jī)制。然而，投資者和證券交易所都認(rèn)為這些反購(gòu)并機(jī)制被超越公司能力地使用，有可能對(duì)公司控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)的功能產(chǎn)生嚴(yán)重影響。在一些案例中，防御購(gòu)并的機(jī)制甚至使得經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層或董事會(huì)逃避了股東的監(jiān)督。在執(zhí)行了任何反購(gòu)并機(jī)制、以及在帶有購(gòu)并建議的交易中，董事會(huì)對(duì)于股東和公司的受托人責(zé)任必須放在第一位。

　　F. The exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders, including institutional investors, should be facilitated.

　　As investors may pursue different investment objectives, the Principles do not advocate any particular investment strategy and do not seek to prescribe the optimal degree of investor activism. Nevertheless, in considering the costs and benefits of exercising their ownership rights, many investors are likely to conclude that positive financial returns and growth can be obtained by undertaking a reasonable amount of analysis and by using their rights.

　　所有股東、包括機(jī)構(gòu)投資者，行使自己的所有權(quán)應(yīng)當(dāng)變得更容易。

　　正如投資者可以追求不同的投資目標(biāo)，本準(zhǔn)則并不推薦任何特定的投資策略，也不企圖開出最佳投資行為的處方。然而，考慮到行使所有權(quán)的成本和收益，許多投資者喜歡得出這樣的結(jié)論：正面的財(cái)務(wù)回報(bào)和增長(zhǎng)能夠被合理的數(shù)量分析承諾和使用他們的權(quán)力來(lái)獲得。

　　1. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their overall corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their investments, including the procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their voting rights.

　　It is increasingly common for shares to be held by institutional investors. The effectiveness and credibility of the entire corporate governance system and company oversight will, therefore, to a large extent depend on institutional investors that can make informed use of their shareholder rights and effectively exercise their ownership functions in companies in which they invest. While this principle does not require institutional investors to vote their shares, it calls for disclosure of how they exercise their ownership rights with due consideration to cost effectiveness. For institutions acting in a fiduciary capacity, such as pension funds, collective investment schemes and some activities of insurance companies, the right to vote can be considered part of the value of the investment being undertaken on behalf of their clients. Failure to exercise the ownership rights could result in a loss to the investor who should therefore be made aware of the policy to be followed by the institutional investors.

　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在受托人的地位上的行為，應(yīng)該公開他們涉及投資的全部公司治理和投票的策略，包括決定使用他們投票權(quán)的適當(dāng)程序。

　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持有股份日益普遍。全部公司治理系統(tǒng)和公司監(jiān)管的有效性和可靠性將因此更多依靠機(jī)構(gòu)投資者，他們能夠得到對(duì)于他們股東權(quán)益更有用的信息、更有效地在他們投資的公司里行使他們的所有權(quán)職能。雖然本準(zhǔn)則不對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者用他們的股份投票有要求，但它要求披露他們出于什么樣的成本效益的正當(dāng)考慮來(lái)行使他們的所有權(quán)。對(duì)于在一個(gè)受托人地位的機(jī)構(gòu)行為，譬如個(gè)人養(yǎng)老基金、集體的投資安排和一些保險(xiǎn)公司行為，投票權(quán)可能被投資所承擔(dān)的客戶利益價(jià)值部分考量過(guò)。錯(cuò)誤地行使所有權(quán)可能導(dǎo)致投資者的損失，但他們應(yīng)該因此而弄明白他們跟從的是機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的什么樣的政策。

　　In some countries, the demand for disclosure of corporate governance policies to the market is quite detailed and includes requirements for explicit strategies regarding the circumstances in which the institution will intervene in a company; the approach they will use for such intervention; and how they will assess the effectiveness of the strategy. In several countries institutional investors are either required to disclose their actual voting records or it is regarded as good practice and implemented on an apply or explain basis. Disclosure is either to their clients (only with respect to the securities of each client) or, in the case of investment advisors to registered investment companies, to the market, which is a less costly procedure. A complementary approach to participation in shareholders’ meetings is to establish a continuing dialogue with portfolio companies. Such a dialogue between institutional investors and companies should be encouraged, especially by lifting unnecessary regulatory barriers, although it is incumbent on the company to treat all investors equally and not to divulge information to the institutional investors which is not at the same time made available to the market. The additional information provided by a company would normally therefore include general background information about the markets in which the company is operating and further elaboration of information already available to the market.

　　When fiduciary institutional investors have developed and disclosed a corporate governance policy, effective implementation requires that they also set aside the appropriate human and financial resources to pursue this policy in a way that their beneficiaries and portfolio companies can expect.

　　在一些國(guó)家，對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)介入一個(gè)公司，公司治理政策對(duì)市場(chǎng)的公開性要求是相當(dāng)細(xì)致的，包括涉及環(huán)境的外在策略要求：他們用于介入的方法、它們?nèi)绾卧u(píng)估策略的效果等。在某些國(guó)家，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者不是被要求公開它真實(shí)的投票記錄、就是按照良好的實(shí)踐來(lái)期望、在應(yīng)用或說(shuō)明性的基礎(chǔ)上來(lái)執(zhí)行。公開化或者針對(duì)他們的客戶(只有對(duì)每一個(gè)客戶證券的重視)、或者針對(duì)市場(chǎng)(在投資顧問(wèn)申請(qǐng)注冊(cè)投資公司的案例中)，那將簡(jiǎn)化昂貴的手續(xù)和程序。在股東大會(huì)上一個(gè)補(bǔ)充的參與方式是建立一個(gè)與證券公司持續(xù)對(duì)話的機(jī)制。盡管對(duì)于公司公平地對(duì)待所有的投資者、以及不對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者泄漏可用于市場(chǎng)的信息是其職責(zé)所在，但這種在機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和公司之間的對(duì)話還是應(yīng)該被提倡，特別是規(guī)章的障礙被提高到不必要的程度時(shí)。因此由公司提供的附加信息通常包括：常規(guī)的背景、關(guān)于公司正在運(yùn)作和將來(lái)的經(jīng)營(yíng)遠(yuǎn)景等市場(chǎng)信息，這些信息已經(jīng)在市場(chǎng)上發(fā)生作用了。

　　當(dāng)作為受托人的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者已經(jīng)揭示和披露公司治理政策時(shí)，有效的執(zhí)行就需要他們留出適當(dāng)?shù)娜诉x和財(cái)物資源、按照他們的收益人和資產(chǎn)組合公司的期望的方式來(lái)推動(dòng)這個(gè)政策。

　　2. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of key ownership rights regarding their investments.

　　The incentives for intermediary owners to vote their shares and exercise key ownership functions may, under certain circumstances, differ from those of direct owners. Such differences may sometimes be commercially sound but may also arise from conflicts of interest which are particularly acute when the fiduciary institution is a subsidiary or an affiliate of another financial institution, and especially an integrated financial group. When such conflicts arise from material business relationships, for example, through an agreement to manage the portfolio company’s funds, such conflicts should be identified and disclosed.

　　At the same time, institutions should disclose what actions they are taking to minimize the potentially negative impact on their ability to exercise key ownership rights. Such actions may include the separation of bonuses for fund management from those related to the acquisition of new business elsewhere in the organisation.

　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在受托人的地位上的行為，應(yīng)該披露他們?nèi)绾螒?yīng)對(duì)那些具體的利益沖突，而這些沖突可能影響到他們投資的關(guān)鍵所有權(quán)的行使。

　　中介所有者用他們的股份投票和行使關(guān)鍵的所有權(quán)行為時(shí)，他們的動(dòng)機(jī)在某些場(chǎng)合可能不同于直接的所有者。這種不同有時(shí)可能有商業(yè)上的合理性，但也有可能源于利益上的沖突。在受托人機(jī)構(gòu)是一個(gè)子公司、或者是另一個(gè)金融機(jī)構(gòu)的關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)、特別是一個(gè)完整的金融集團(tuán)時(shí)，這種利益的沖突就表現(xiàn)得非常明顯。當(dāng)這樣的沖突產(chǎn)生于實(shí)質(zhì)性的商業(yè)關(guān)系時(shí)，比如，通過(guò)一個(gè)協(xié)議管理證券公司的基金，這種沖突應(yīng)該被確認(rèn)和披露。

　　同時(shí)，機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該披露他們?cè)谛惺龟P(guān)鍵的所有權(quán)中采取了那些行動(dòng)來(lái)最大程度地減小潛在的消極影響。這些行為包括，剝離那些給基金管理層的紅利與來(lái)自組織之外的新的商業(yè)收益之間的關(guān)系。

　　G. Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights as defined in the Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse.

　　It has long been recognized that in companies with dispersed ownership, individual shareholders might have too small a stake in the company to warrant the cost of taking action or for making an investment in monitoring performance. Moreover, if small shareholders did invest resources in such activities, others would also gain without having contributed (i.e. they are free riders). This effect, which serves to lower incentives for monitoring, is probably less of a problem for institutions, particularly financial institutions action in a fiduciary capacity, in deciding whether to increase their ownership to a significant stake in individual companies, or to rather simply diversify. However, other costs with regard to holding a significant stake might still be high. In many instances institutional investors are prevented from doing this because it is beyond their capacity or would require investing more of their assets in one company than may be prudent. To overcome this asymmetry which favours diversification, they should be allowed, and even encouraged, to co-operate and co-ordinate their actions in nominating and electing board members, placing proposals on the agenda and holding discussions directly with a company in order to improve its corporate governance. More generally, shareholders should be allowed to communicate with each other without having to comply with the formalities of proxy solicitation.

　　股東、包括機(jī)構(gòu)股東，除了防止濫用之外，應(yīng)當(dāng)準(zhǔn)許對(duì)有關(guān)股東的基本權(quán)利在諸如本準(zhǔn)則中的定義等方面進(jìn)行相互協(xié)商。

　　公司所有權(quán)的分散化已有很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間，對(duì)于在公司保證采取行動(dòng)的成本或者在監(jiān)控作用上所作的投資來(lái)講，單個(gè)股東可能只有太小的股份。而且，如果小股東將資源投資于這樣的行為上，其他的人沒(méi)有貢獻(xiàn)也將有收益(例如 搭便車者free riders)。這種處于較低監(jiān)控地位的結(jié)果，對(duì)于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者、尤其處于受托人地位的金融機(jī)構(gòu)的行為上來(lái)講，決定寧可在一個(gè)數(shù)量十分巨大的股份上對(duì)個(gè)人公司增加他們的所有權(quán)、還是完全多樣化投資，這并不是一個(gè)很大的問(wèn)題。然而，持有一個(gè)數(shù)量十分巨大的股份的其他成本可能仍舊很高。在許多案例中，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者被防止這樣做，因?yàn)檫@超過(guò)了他們的能力、或可能比謹(jǐn)慎性的要求更多地把他們的資產(chǎn)投資在一個(gè)公司里。要克服這種有利于多樣化的不對(duì)稱，他們應(yīng)該在提名和選擇董事會(huì)成員、在議程中提出建議、為了促進(jìn)一個(gè)公司的公司治理而保持對(duì)一個(gè)公司的直接討論等方面，被準(zhǔn)許、甚至被鼓勵(lì)合作和協(xié)調(diào)他們的行為。更通常的，股東應(yīng)該被允許相互交流而不拘泥于代理請(qǐng)求的形式。

　　It must be recognized, however, that co-operation among investors could also be used to manipulate markets and to obtain control over a company without being subject to any takeover regulations. Moreover, co-operation might also be for the purposes of circumventing competition law. For this reason, in some countries, the ability of institutional investors to co-operate on their voting strategy is either limited or prohibited. Shareholder agreements may also be closely monitored. However, if co-operation does not involve issues of corporate control, or conflict with concerns about market efficiently and fairness, the benefits of more effective ownership may still be obtained. Necessary disclosure of co-operation among investors, institutional or otherwise, may have to be accompanied by provisions which prevent trading for a period so as to avoid the possibility of market manipulation.

　　無(wú)論如何必須承認(rèn)，投資者之間的合作也能夠用來(lái)操縱市場(chǎng)、并不受任何購(gòu)并規(guī)則制約地獲得對(duì)某一公司的控制權(quán)。而且這種合作也可能用于規(guī)避競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法律的目的?；谶@個(gè)理由，一些國(guó)家對(duì)于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在他們投票策略上的合作能力不是采取限制措施就是完全禁止。股東協(xié)議也可以嚴(yán)密監(jiān)控。然而，如果合作不涉及公司控制問(wèn)題、或者與公司的市場(chǎng)效益和公平不相抵觸，更多有效的所有權(quán)收益可以仍舊獲取。機(jī)構(gòu)或其他方面的投資者之間的合作公開的必要性，也許只能用有關(guān)規(guī)定來(lái)補(bǔ)充，從而避免操縱市場(chǎng)可能性的產(chǎn)生。

　　III. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders股東的公平待遇

　　The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.

　　Investors’ confidence that the capital they provide will be protected from misuse or misappropriation by corporate managers, board members or controlling shareholders is an important factor in the capital markets. Corporate boards, managers and controlling shareholders may have the opportunity to engage in activities that may advance their own interests at the expense of non-controlling shareholders. In providing protection to investors, a distinction can usefully be made between ex-ante and ex-post shareholder rights. Ex-ante rights are, for example, pre-emptive rights and qualified majorities for certain decisions. Ex-post rights allow the seeking of redress once rights have been violated. In jurisdictions where the enforcement of the legal and regulatory framework is weak, some countries have found it desirable to strengthen the ex-ante rights of shareholders such as by low share ownership thresholds for placing items on the agenda of the shareholders meeting or by requiring supermajority of shareholders for certain important decisions. The Principles support equal treatment for foreign and domestic shareholders in corporate governance. They do not address government policies to regulate foreign direct investment.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)當(dāng)保證所有股東的公平待遇，包括少數(shù)股東和國(guó)外的股東。所有的股東都應(yīng)該在他們的權(quán)利受損時(shí)獲得有效的補(bǔ)償?shù)臋C(jī)會(huì)。

　　投資人對(duì)于他們所提供的資金不被公司經(jīng)理層、董事會(huì)成員或控股股東濫用和侵占的信心是資本市場(chǎng)的重要因素。公司董事會(huì)、經(jīng)理層和控股股東有機(jī)會(huì)從事?lián)p害非控股股東的利益而使自己獲利的行為。在保護(hù)投資者的規(guī)定中，一個(gè)特征能夠有效地區(qū)分事前和事后之間的股東權(quán)利。事前的權(quán)利譬如是先發(fā)制人的權(quán)利、和對(duì)于某些決策的合格多數(shù)。事后權(quán)利在一旦權(quán)利被侵害時(shí)準(zhǔn)許尋求賠償。在法律和規(guī)章制度的執(zhí)行很弱的地方，一些國(guó)家建立了適當(dāng)強(qiáng)化股東事前權(quán)利的措施，比如為了在股東大會(huì)議程放置條款而降低股份所有權(quán)的門檻、或者在某些重要的決策中要求有超過(guò)50%股東通過(guò)。本準(zhǔn)則支持在公司治理中公平對(duì)待外國(guó)股東和國(guó)內(nèi)股東。但這并不涉及政府如何管理外國(guó)直接投資的政策問(wèn)題。

　　股東可執(zhí)行其權(quán)利的途徑之一是能夠?qū)?jīng)營(yíng)管理層和董事會(huì)成員發(fā)起法律和行政訴訟程序。經(jīng)驗(yàn)顯示，決定股東權(quán)利受保護(hù)程度的重要因素，是能否找到一個(gè)有效的方法，可以用合理的成本并且避免過(guò)多拖延地獲得被損害權(quán)益的補(bǔ)償。當(dāng)少數(shù)股東有合理的依據(jù)相信他們的權(quán)力已經(jīng)受到侵害，法律制度能夠提供給他們提起訴訟的機(jī)制，這可以強(qiáng)化中小投資者的信心。提供這樣的執(zhí)行機(jī)制是立法者和監(jiān)管者的關(guān)鍵職責(zé)。

　　One of the ways in which shareholders can enforce their rights is to be able to initiate legal and administrative proceedings against management and board members. Experience has shown that an important determinant of the degree to which shareholder rights are protected is whether effective methods exist to obtain redress for grievances at a reasonable cost and without excessive delay. The confidence of minority investors is enhanced when the legal system provides mechanisms for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have reasonable grounds to believe that their rights have been violated. The provision of such enforcement mechanism is a key responsibility of legislators and regulators.

　　There is some risk that a legal system, which enables any investors to challenge corporate activity in the courts, can become prone to excessive litigation. Thus, many legal systems have introduced provisions to protect management and board members against litigation abuse in the form of tests for the sufficiency of shareholder complaints, so-called safe harbours for management and board member actions (such as the business judgement rule) as well as safe harbours for the disclosure of information. In the end, a balance must be struck between allowing investors to seek remedies for infringement of ownership rights and avoiding excessive litigation. Many countries have found that alternative adjudication procedures, such as administrative hearings or arbitration procedures organized by the securities regulators or other regulatory bodies, are an efficient method for dispute settlement, at least at the first instance level.

　　鼓勵(lì)投資者在法庭質(zhì)詢公司的行為，這樣的法律制度存在著一定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，也許會(huì)造成濫訟。因而許多法律系統(tǒng)引進(jìn)了保護(hù)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層和董事會(huì)成員免受濫訟的規(guī)定。包括監(jiān)測(cè)股東申訴的充分性、對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層和董事會(huì)成員行為(如商業(yè)判斷規(guī)則)的所謂安全港、以及信息披露的安全港等。最終必須在允許投資者對(duì)所遭受損害的所有權(quán)尋求法律救濟(jì)與防止濫訟之間求得平衡。許多國(guó)家發(fā)現(xiàn)，其他可供選擇的裁決程序，例如有證券監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)或其他監(jiān)管主體舉行的行政聽(tīng)證會(huì)或仲裁程序是解決爭(zhēng)端的有效方法，至少在爭(zhēng)議的最初階段是這樣。