A. All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally.

　　同一類別、同一系列的股東應當?shù)玫酵瑯拥墓酱觥?/span>

　　1. Within any series of a class, all shares should carry the same rights. All investors should be able to obtain information about the rights attached to all series and classes of shares before they purchase. Any changes in voting rights should be subject to approval by those classes of shares which are negatively affected.

　　The optimal capital structure of the firm is best decided by the management and the board, subject to the approval of the shareholders. Some companies issue preferred (or preference) shares which have a preference in respect of receipt of the profits of the firm but which normally have no voting rights. Companies may also issue participation certificates or shares without voting rights, which would presumably trade may be effective in distributing risk and reward in ways that are thought to be in the best interests of the company and to cost-efficient financing. The Principles do not take a position on the concept of one share one vote. However, many institutional investors and shareholders associations support this concept.

　　Investors can expect to be informed regarding their voting rights before they invest. Once they have invested, their rights should not be changed unless those holding voting shares have had the opportunity to participate in the decision. Proposals to change the voting rights of different series and classes of shares should be submitted for approval at general shareholders meetings by a specified majority of voting shares in the affected categories.

　　在同一類別任何系列內(nèi)，所有的股份都應該具有同樣的權(quán)利。所有的投資者在他們購買之前都應該獲得有關(guān)全部類別和系列股份所賦有的權(quán)利的信息。在投票權(quán)上的任何改變都應該被受到負面影響的股份類別核準。

　　公司最理想的資本結(jié)構(gòu)最好由經(jīng)營層和董事會決定、并由股東批準。一些公司發(fā)行優(yōu)先股，這些優(yōu)先股在分配公司利潤方面有優(yōu)先權(quán)，但它通常沒有投票權(quán)。公司也可以發(fā)行參與憑證或無投票權(quán)股股份，它們與具有投票權(quán)的股份交易價格可能不同。所有這些制度在分散風險和分配報酬上是很有效的，而且被認為是符合公司利益和成本效益的最佳籌資方式。本準則對一股一票不置立場，然而許多機構(gòu)投資者和股東協(xié)會支持這樣的觀念。

　　投資者在投資前有權(quán)被告知有關(guān)投票權(quán)的信息。一旦他們投資以后，他們的權(quán)力不應該被改變，除非這些持有投票權(quán)的股份已經(jīng)有機會參與了決策。改變不同系列和類別股份投票權(quán)的提案應該被提交股東大會、由受到影響部分的投票股份的一個特定多數(shù)同意才能通過。

　　2. Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and should have effective means of redress.

　　Many publicly traded companies have a large controlling shareholder. While the presence of a controlling shareholder can reduce the agency problem by closer monitoring of management, weaknesses in the legal and regulatory framework may lead to the abuse of other shareholders in the company. The potential for abuse is marked where the legal system allows, and the market accepts, controlling shareholders to exercise a level of control which does not correspond to the level of risk that they assume as owners through exploiting legal devices to separate ownership from control, such as pyramid structures or multiple voting rights. Such abuse may be carried out in various ways, including the extraction of direct private benefits via high pay and bonuses for employed family members and associates, inappropriate related party transactions, systematic bias in business decisions and changes in the capital structure through special issuance of shares favouring the controlling shareholder.

　　對于控股股東濫用行為造成的利益上的直接或間接傷害，小股東應當受到保護，并且應該有有效的補償方法。

　　許多公眾公司都有一位大的控股股東。雖然控股股東的存在能夠通過更密切的管理監(jiān)控減少代理人問題，但是在法律和監(jiān)管結(jié)構(gòu)方面的不足可能導致不公正對待公司其他股東。潛在的不公正對待在于，控股股東通過采取合法機制，比如金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)或多重投票權(quán)，將所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離，使他們得以行使與他們承擔的風險程度不相稱的控制力，且被法律允許、被市場接受。這樣的不公正對待能通過不同的方法得以解決，包括通過提取直接的個人收益給員工的家庭成員和公司成員以高額報酬和獎金、不相稱關(guān)聯(lián)團體的交易、商業(yè)決策中有意的偏向和通過特別發(fā)行股票促使控股股東改變資本結(jié)構(gòu)等等。

　　In addition to disclosure, a key to protecting minority shareholders is a clearly articulated duty of loyalty by board members to the company and to all shareholders. Indeed, abuse of minority shareholders is most pronounced in those countries where the legal and regulatory framework is weak in this regard. A particular issue arises in some jurisdictions where groups of companies are prevalent and where the duty of loyalty of a board member might be ambiguous and even interpreted as to the group. In these cases, some countries are now moving to control negative effects by specifying that a transaction in favour of another group company must be offset by receiving a corresponding benefit from other companies of the group.

　　Other common provisions to protect minority shareholders, which have proven effective, include pre-emptive rights in relation to share issues, qualified majorities for certain shareholder decisions and the possibility to use circumstances, some jurisdictions require or permit controlling shareholders to buy-out the remaining shareholders at a share-price that is established through an independent appraisal. This is particularly important when controlling shareholders decide to de-list an enterprise. Other means of improving minority shareholder rights include derivative and class action law suits. With the common aim of improving market credibility, the choice and ultimate design of different provisions to protect minority shareholders necessarily depends on the overall regulatory framework and the national legal system.

　　除了公開性，保護小股東的方法還包括董事會成員向公司和所有股東明確忠誠義務。事實上，對小股東的不公正對待主要來自那些在這方面法律和監(jiān)管結(jié)構(gòu)不完善的國家。在那些集團公司比較流行、董事會成員的忠誠責任模糊不清甚至被曲解成小團體利益的地方，這種問題特別容易發(fā)生。在這些案例中，一些國家現(xiàn)在明確規(guī)定，有利于其他集團公司的交易必須用獲得的相應收益來抵消，并通過這種方法來控制負面效應。

　　其他經(jīng)常使用并以證明是有效的保護小股東的規(guī)定還包括，在有關(guān)股票發(fā)行問題上的先發(fā)制人的權(quán)力，對某些股東決策采用有效多數(shù)的方式，以及在選舉董事會成員時采用累計投票制度。在某些情況下，一些法規(guī)要求或允許控股股東以通過獨立估價計算得出的股價收購剩余股東的股票。當控股股東決定將一個股份公司改變?yōu)槌篇氋Y控股企業(yè)的時候，這個舉措就特別重要了。其他改善小股東權(quán)利的方法包括派生和集團訴訟。為了改善市場信譽的公共目標，選擇和最終設計各種條款來保護小股東，必須依賴整體的監(jiān)管結(jié)構(gòu)和國家法律體系

　　3. Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed upon with the beneficial owner of the shares.

　　In some OECD countries it was customary for financial institutions which held shares in custody for investors to cast the votes of those shares. Custodians such as banks and brokerage firms holding securities as nominees for customers were sometimes required to vote in support of management unless specially instructed by the shareholder to do otherwise.

　　The trend in OECD countries is to remove provisions that automatically enable custodian institutions to cast the votes of shareholders. Rules in some countries have recently been revised to require custodian institutions to provide shareholders with information concerning their options in the use of their voting rights. Shareholders may elect to delegate all voting rights to custodians. Alternatively, shareholders may choose to be informed of all upcoming shareholder votes and may decide to cast some votes while delegating some voting rights t the custodian. It is necessary to draw a reasonable balance between assuring that shareholder votes are not cast by custodians without regard for the wishes of shareholders and not imposing excessive burdens on custodians to secure shareholder approval before casting votes. It is sufficient to disclose to the shareholders that, if no instruction to the contrary is received, the custodian will vote the shares in the way it deems consistent with shareholder interest.

　　It should be noted that this principle does not apply to the exercise of voting rights by trustees or other persons acting under a special legal mandate (such as, for example, bankruptcy receivers and estate executors).

　　Holders of depository receipts should be provided with the same ultimate rights and practical opportunities to participate in corporate governance as are accorded to holders of the underlying shares. Where the direct holders of shares may use proxies, the depositary, trust office or equivalent body should therefore issue on a timely basis to depositary receipt holders. The depository receipt holders should be able to issue binding voting instructions with respect to the shares, which the depositary or trust office holds on their behalf.

　　選舉應該在有表決權(quán)的股權(quán)所有者協(xié)商同意的方式上由托管人和代理人投票。

　　在一些OECD國家，那些為投資者保管股份的金融機構(gòu)通常會以那些股份投票。擁有證券的托管人，如銀行和經(jīng)紀公司，作為代理人，有時候被要求投票支持經(jīng)營管理層的意愿，除非股東明確表示做其他的選擇。

　　OECD國家現(xiàn)在的趨勢是，廢除那些自動讓托管機構(gòu)為股東投票的條例。一些國家的法規(guī)最近已經(jīng)被修訂，它要求托管機構(gòu)為股東提供關(guān)于是否選擇使用他們的投票權(quán)的信息。股東可以選擇將所有的投票權(quán)委托給托管人。股東可以選擇被告知所有預定投票的股東的表決信息，也可以在將一些投票權(quán)委托給托管人的同時自己也決定參與部分投票。保證股東的投票權(quán)在未得到其同意的情況下不得由托管人代為投票，以及不至于因為托管人在投票表決前為取得股東核準而增加過多負擔，在這兩者之間取得平衡是非常必須的。向股東充分說明而沒有得到反對的指示，托管人將按照自己所認為的符合股東利益的方式進行投票。

　　我們必須注意，這個原則不適用于托管人或其他特殊法律委任托管的人執(zhí)行投票權(quán)(比如，破產(chǎn)接管人和財產(chǎn)執(zhí)行人)。

　　存托憑證持有人應該被提供和優(yōu)先股股東相同的最終權(quán)和參與公司治理的實踐機會。在直接股票持有人可能使用代理投票權(quán)的地方，存托公司、信托機構(gòu)或相似的其他機構(gòu)因此應該及時向存托憑證持有人提供代理投票服務。存托憑證持有人應該能夠發(fā)出與他的股份相等的約束投票指示，使得存托公司、信托機構(gòu)就像他們自己持有這些權(quán)益一樣。

　　4. Impediments to cross border voting should be eliminated.

　　Foreign investors often hold their shares through chains of intermediaries. Shares are typically held in accounts with securities intermediaries, that in turn hold accounts with other intermediaries and central securities depositories in other jurisdictions, while the listed company resides in third country. Such cross-border chains cause special challenges with respect to determining the entitlement of foreign investors to use their voting rights, and the process of communicating with such investors. In combination with business practices which provide only a very short notice period, shareholders are often left with only very limited time to react to a convening notice by the company and to make informed decisions concerning items for decision. This makes cross border voting difficult. The legal and regulatory framework should clarify who is entitled to control the voting rights in cross border situations and where necessary to simplify the depository chain. Moreover, notice periods should ensure that foreign investors in effect have similar opportunities to exercise their ownership functions as domestic investors. To further facilitate voting by foreign investors, laws, regulations and corporate practices should allow participation through means which make use of modern technology.

　　對遠程投票的妨礙應當被去除。

　　國外投資者常常通過中介的連鎖企業(yè)持有股份。當上市公司所在地是第三國，典型的做法是股份由有財務關(guān)系的證券中介持有，在其他地方也會輪流由其他中介機構(gòu)和中央證券存托機構(gòu)所持有。這種遠程連鎖企業(yè)在決定國外投資者的投票權(quán)和與這些投資者的交流過程方面遇到了特殊的挑戰(zhàn)。由于只提供非常短暫的告知期的商業(yè)慣例帶來的是，持股人通常也只有非常有限的時間來對公司的召集告知做出反應，并對需要做出決定的事項做出決策。這就使遠程投票變得困難。法律和監(jiān)管制度應該明確誰被授權(quán)在這種情況下控制投票權(quán)，并且簡化存托連鎖環(huán)節(jié)。除此之外，告知期也應該保證國外投資者與國內(nèi)投資者具有相同的機會來行使他們的所有權(quán)。為了讓國外投資者更容易地投票，法律、規(guī)章和公司慣例應該通過使用現(xiàn)代化技術(shù)讓他們參與進來。

　　5. Process and procedures for general shareholder meetings should allow for equitable treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures should not make it unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes.

　　The right to participate in general shareholder meetings is a fundamental shareholder right. Management and controlling investors have at times sought to discourage non-controlling or foreign investors from trying to influence the direction of the company. Some companies have charged fees for voting. Other impediments included prohibitions on proxy voting and the requirement of personal attendance at general shareholder meetings to vote. Still other procedures may make it practically impossible to exercise ownership rights. Proxy materials may be sent too close to the time of general shareholder meetings to allow investors adequate time for reflection and consultation. Many companies in OECD countries are seeking to develop better channels of communication and decision-making with shareholders. Efforts by companies to remove artificial barriers to participation in general meetings are encouraged and the corporate governance framework should facilitate the use of electronic voting in absentia.

　　普通股東大會的過程和程序應該對所有股東都公平對待。公司程序不應使得投票過分復雜困難和花費昂貴。

　　參加普通股東大會的權(quán)利是股東的基本權(quán)利。經(jīng)營管理層和控股投資者有時會阻礙非控股投資者或外國投資者來影響公司的方向。一些公司要求負擔投票費用。其他障礙還包括阻止代理人投票和要求親自出席普通股東大會投票。還有一些其他程序可能讓股東在實際上無法行使投票權(quán)。代理人材料可能僅在股東大會之前被發(fā)送，以至于投資者沒有充足的時間思考和咨詢。在OECD國家的許多公司正在尋找發(fā)展更好的與股東交流和決策的渠道。鼓勵公司去努力消除參加普通股東大會的人為障礙，而且當股東缺席時，公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應該推動使用電子投票。

　　B. Insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited

　　Abusive self-dealing occurs when persons having close relationships to the company, including controlling shareholders, exploit those relationships to the detriment of the company and investors. As insider trading entails manipulation of the capital markets, it is prohibited by securities regulations, company law and/or criminal law in most OECD countries. However, not all jurisdictions prohibit such practices, and in some cases enforcement is not vigorous. These practices can be seen as constituting a breach of good corporate governance in as much as they violate the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders.

　　The Principles reaffirm that it is reasonable for investors to expect that the abuse of insider power be prohibited. In cases where such abuses are not specifically forbidden by legislation or where enforcement is not effective, it will be important for governments to take measures to remove any such gaps.

　　內(nèi)部交易和濫用的私利交易應該被禁止。

　　當與公司有密切關(guān)系的個人、包括控股股東，利用那些關(guān)系來損害公司和投資人的利益時，濫用的私利交易就發(fā)生了。當內(nèi)部交易導致操縱資本市場時，在大多數(shù)OECD國家，這種行為被證券規(guī)章、公司法和/或刑法嚴明禁止。然而，不是所有的地方都禁止這種行為，而且在一些情況下，強制也并不是非常有力。這些情況可能造成公司治理的漏洞，因為它們違背了股東的公平待遇原則。

　　本準則重申，投資者對禁止濫用內(nèi)部權(quán)利的期待是合理的。在這種濫用未被立法明確禁止或強制力并不有效的地方，政府采取措施來去除所有這種漏洞就變得尤其重要。

　　C. Members of the board and key executives should be required to disclose to the board whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a material interest in any transaction or matter directly affecting the corporation.

　　Members of the board and key executives have an obligation to inform the board where they have a business, family or other special relationship outside of the company that could affect their judgement with respect to a particular transaction or matter affecting the company. Such special relationships include situations where executives and board members have a relationship with the company via their association with a shareholder who is in a position to exercise control. Where a material interest has been declared, it is good practice for that person not to be involved in any decision involving the transaction or matter.

　　在直接影響到企業(yè)的任何交易或事件中，無論董事會成員和關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營人員直接、間接或在第三方利益上對于董事會具有實質(zhì)性利益的，都應當被要求公開。

　　當董事會成員和關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營人員在所從事的商業(yè)活動中，他們的家庭成員或公司外其他特殊關(guān)系可能影響他們對某項特定交易或影響與公司相關(guān)事件的判斷的，他們有義務通知董事會。這種特殊的關(guān)系包括經(jīng)營人員和董事會成員通過與有控制權(quán)的股東的勾結(jié)，與公司產(chǎn)生利害關(guān)系。在實質(zhì)性利益被揭示的情況下，最好的辦法就是使那個人排除在這項交易或事件的決策之外。

　　IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance利益相關(guān)者的角色

　　The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.

　　A key aspect of corporate governance is concerned with ensuring the flow of external capital to companies both in the form of equity and credit. Corporate governance is also concerned with finding ways to encourage the various stakeholders in the firm to undertake economically optimal levels of investment in firm-specific human and physical capital. The competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the result of teamwork that embodies contributions from a range of different resource providers including investors, employees, creditors, and suppliers. Corporations should recognize that the contributions stakeholders constitute a valuable resource for building competitive and profitable companies. It is, therefore, in the long-term interest of corporation are served by recognizing the interests of stakeholders and their contribution to the long-term success of the corporation.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)將認可法律和互相協(xié)商賦予利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)利，并且鼓勵企業(yè)和利益相關(guān)者在創(chuàng)造財富、工作機會和持續(xù)推動企業(yè)財務健康等方面積極合作。

　　公司治理關(guān)注的一個關(guān)鍵方面是確保外部資金流以公平和誠信的方式進入公司。公司治理也關(guān)注尋找一種方法，以便鼓勵公司里的各種利益相關(guān)者對企業(yè)特有的人力和物質(zhì)資本擔負起經(jīng)濟的最佳投資水平。一個公司的競爭力和最終的成功，來自于包括投資者、員工、債權(quán)人和供貨商等不同資源提供者的具體貢獻的協(xié)同努力的結(jié)果。對于利益相關(guān)者為公司的競爭力和盈利性所組成的有價值的資源，公司應當承認他們的貢獻。因此，在利益相關(guān)者中鼓勵價值創(chuàng)造合作，這是公司的長遠利益之所在。治理結(jié)構(gòu)應該認可，公司利益是由承認利益相關(guān)者的利益和他們對于公司的長遠成功的貢獻所構(gòu)成的。

　　A. The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are to be respected.

　　In all OECD countries, the rights of stakeholders are established by law (e.g. labour, business, commercial and insolvency laws) or by contractual relations. Even in areas where stakeholder interests are not legislated, many firms make additional commitments to stakeholders, and concern over corporate reputation and corporate performance often requires the recognition of broader interests.

　　通過法律和互相協(xié)議賦予利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)利受到尊重。

　　在所有的OECD國家，利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)利是由法律(例如勞工法、商法、貿(mào)易法和破產(chǎn)法)或者契約關(guān)系所確定的。甚至在利益相關(guān)者的利益沒有被立法的地區(qū)，許多公司也對利益相關(guān)者制定了附加的約定，并且，關(guān)注公司的聲譽和業(yè)績常常要求對于廣泛利益的重視。

　　B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.

　　The legal framework and process should be transparent and not impede ability of stakeholders to communicate and to obtain redress for the violation of rights.

　　利益相關(guān)者的利益受到法律的保護，在他們的權(quán)利受到損害時應當獲得有效補償?shù)臋C會。

　　法律框架和程序應當是透明的、并不能對利益相關(guān)者在權(quán)利受損時溝通能力和獲得補償能力的作用產(chǎn)生阻礙。

　　C. Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop.

　　The degree to which employees participate in corporate governance depends on national laws and practices, and may vary from company to company as well. In the context of corporate governance, performance enhancing mechanisms for participation may benefit companies directly as well as indirectly through the readiness by employees to invest in firm specific skills. Examples of mechanisms for employee participation include: employee representation on boards; and governance processes such as works councils that consider employee viewpoints in certain key decision. With respect to performance enhancing mechanisms, employee stock ownership plans or other profit sharing mechanisms are to be found in many countries. Pension commitments are also often an element of the relationship between the company and its past and present employees. Where such commitments involve establishing an independent fund, its trustees should be independent of the company’s management and manage the fund for all beneficiaries.

　　提高員工參與程度的機制應當被允許發(fā)展。

　　在公司治理中員工的參與程度，依賴于國家的法律和實際狀況，并且可能在公司和公司之間也有所不同。在公司治理的環(huán)境中，提高參與程度的機制使得員工掌握公司特殊技能的途徑更簡化便捷，從而使公司直接和間接地得益。員工參與機制的例子包括：在董事會中的員工代表，以及在某些關(guān)鍵決策中考慮到員工觀點的、像勞工理事會那樣的治理程序。至于提高參與性的機制，員工持股計劃、或其他利潤分享機制在許多國家被建立。養(yǎng)老金投入對于公司與過去及現(xiàn)在的員工之間的關(guān)系來說也是一個基本要素。這類投入包括建立一個獨立的基金，它的托管人應該獨立于公司的經(jīng)營管理層、并為所有的受益人管理基金。

　　D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis.

　　Where laws and practice of corporate governance systems provide for participation by stakeholders, it is important that stakeholders have access to information necessary to fulfil their responsibilities.

　　在公司治理過程中利益相關(guān)者參與的地方，在及時和有規(guī)則的基礎上，他們應該有渠道獲得恰當?shù)摹⒊浞值?、可靠的信息?/span>

　　在公司治理系統(tǒng)的法律和實踐中提供給利益相關(guān)者參與的地方，利益相關(guān)者是否具有履行它們責任的必需的信息渠道，這是十分重要的。

　　E. Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board and their rights should not be compromised for doing this.

　　Unethical and illegal practices by corporate officers may not only violate the rights of stakeholders but also be to the detriment of the company and its shareholders in terms of reputation effects and an increasing risk of future financial liabilities. It is therefore to the advantage of the company and its shareholders to establish procedures and safe-harbours for complaints by employees, either personally or through their representative bodies, and others outside the company, concerning illegal and unethical behaviour. In many countries the board is being encouraged by laws and or principles to protect these individuals and representative bodies and to give them confidential direct access to someone independent on the board, often a member of an audit or an ethics committee. Some companies have established an ombudsman to deal with complaints. Several regulators have also established confidential phone and e-mail facilities to receive allegations. While in certain countries representative employee bodies undertake the tasks of conveying concerns to the company, individual employees should not be precluded from, or be less protected, when acting alone. When there is an inadequate response to a complaint regarding contravention of the law, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises encourage them to report their bona fide complaint to the competent public authorities. The company should refrain from discriminatory or disciplinary actions against such employees or bodies.

　　利益相關(guān)者，包括個別員工和他們的代表，應該能夠自由地交換他們關(guān)于對董事會違法和不道德行為的看法，在做這些時他們的權(quán)利不應受到損害。

　　公司官員的不道德和違法行為可能不僅侵害了利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)利、而且也在財產(chǎn)信譽期限和增加未來金融責任風險上對公司和他的股東造成了損害。相對于因違法和不道德行為而被員工親自或者他們的代表、被公司外部的其他人起訴，公司和他們的股東建立一套程序和安全措施將是有利的。在許多國家，董事會被法律或其他準則鼓勵，保護這些員工個人和他們的代表人;并常常賦予一個審計成員、或者是一個道德委員會建立獨立于董事會的秘密的直接渠道。針對帶有投訴的交易，一些公司設立了一個調(diào)查公司官員舞弊的職務。作為某種調(diào)節(jié)手段，也設立了保密電話和電子郵件設施來接收辯解。而在一些國家，當員工代表承擔了向公司轉(zhuǎn)遞信息的任務時，個別員工應當不被排除在外，或者在單獨行動時應得到充分保護。當一個違反法律的申訴得到了不適當?shù)姆磻獣r，OECD《跨國企業(yè)指引》鼓勵他們將 善意申訴提交給勝任的公共管理機構(gòu)。公司應該杜絕針對這些員工和代表的歧視和懲戒行為。

　　(6)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應當被一個有效的破產(chǎn)機制和債權(quán)實施機制所補充。

　　F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor rights.

　　Especially in emerging markets, creditors are a key stakeholder and the terms, volume and type of credit extended to firms will depend importantly on their rights and on their enforceability. Companies with a good corporate governance record are often able to borrow larger sums and on more favourable terms than those with poor records or which operate in non-transparent markets. The framework for corporate insolvency varies widely across countries. In some countries, when companies are nearing insolvency, the legislative framework imposes a duty on directors to act in the interests of creditors, who might therefore play a prominent role in the governance of the company. Other countries have mechanisms which encourage the debtor to reveal timely information about the company’s difficulties so that a consensual solution can be found between the debtor and its creditors.

　　Creditors’ rights vary, ranging from secured bond holders to unsecured creditors. Insolvency procedures usually require efficient mechanisms for reconciling the interests of different classes of creditors. In many jurisdictions provision is made for special rights such as through debtor in possession financing which provides incentives/protection for new funds made available to the enterprise in bankruptcy.

　　特別是在市場化過程中，債權(quán)人是利益相關(guān)者的關(guān)鍵，公司將主要依靠他們的權(quán)利和法律的可執(zhí)行性來提升自己信用的期限、數(shù)量和形式。具有良好公司治理紀錄的公司，經(jīng)常能夠比那些有不良記錄的、帶有不透明市場運作的企業(yè)借到更多數(shù)量和更優(yōu)惠期限的資金。公司破產(chǎn)制度在不同國家有廣泛的變化。在一些國家，當公司接近于破產(chǎn)時，法律制度通過對董事的征稅來保護債權(quán)人的利益，使之在公司的治理中扮演突出的角色。在其他國家有這樣的機制，督促債務人及時披露有關(guān)公司困難的信息，以便債務人和債權(quán)人雙方能夠找到都能接受的解決辦法。

　　債權(quán)人的權(quán)利常在安全的合同持有者和不安全的債權(quán)人之間改變。破產(chǎn)程序通常需要有效的機制，來調(diào)解不同類別的債權(quán)人的利益。在許多司法規(guī)定中，制定了特別的權(quán)利，像通過用激勵/保護方式對債務人財產(chǎn)進行金融運作，使企業(yè)破產(chǎn)時新的賠償基金的建立成為可能。

　　V. Disclosure and Transparency信息披露和透明度

　　The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company.

　　In most OECD countries a large amount of information, both mandatory and voluntary, is compiled on publicly traded and large unlisted enterprises, and subsequently disseminated to a broad range of users. Public disclosure is typically required, at a minimum, on an annual basis though some countries require periodic disclosure on a semi-annual or quarterly basis, or even more frequently in the case of material developments affecting the company. Companies often make voluntary disclosure that goes beyond minimum disclosure requirements in response to market demand.

　　A strong disclosure regime that promotes real transparency is a pivotal feature of market-based monitoring of companies and is central to shareholders’ ability to exercise their ownership rights on an informed basis. Experience in countries with large and active equity markets shows that disclosure can also be a powerful tool for influencing the behaviour of companies and for protecting investors. A strong disclosure regime can help to attract capital and maintain confidence in the capital markets. By contrast, weak disclosure and non-transparent practices can contribute to unethical behaviour and to a loss of market integrity at great cost, not just to the company and its shareholders but also to the economy as a whole. Shareholders and potential investors require access to regular, reliable and comparable information in sufficient detail for them to assess the stewardship of management, and make informed decisions about the valuation, ownership and voting of shares. Insufficient or unclear information may hamper the ability of the markets to function, increase the cost of capital and result in a poor allocation of resources.

　　Disclosure also helps improve public understanding of the structure and activities of enterprises, corporate policies and performance with respect to environmental and ethical standards, and companies’ relationships with the communities in which they operate. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are relevant in this context.

　　Disclosure requirements are not expected to place unreasonable administrative or cost burdens on enterprises. Nor are companies expected to disclose information that may endanger their competitive position unless disclosure is necessary to fully inform the investment decision and to avoid misleading the investor. In order to determine what information should be disclosed at a minimum, many countries apply the concept of materiality. Material information can be defined as information whose omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions taken by users of information.

　　The Principles support timely disclosure of all material developments that arise between regular reports. They also support simultaneous reporting of information to all shareholders in order to ensure their equitable treatment. In maintaining close relations with investors and market participants, companies must be careful not to violate this fundamental principle of equitable treatment.

　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應該保證公司所有重大事件及時地、準確地得到披露，包括財務狀況、業(yè)績、所有權(quán)和公司治理的情況。

　　在大部分OECD成員國，大量強制和自愿披露的信息都是在上市公司及大型未上市公司中匯集和編撰的，這些信息隨后散布到廣大的信息使用者手中。國際上一般規(guī)定公司至少每年度公開披露信息，還有一些國家規(guī)定公司每半年或每季度披露信息，甚至在一些事件的出現(xiàn)影響到企業(yè)的重大發(fā)展時，要求更頻繁的信息披露。企業(yè)經(jīng)常自愿披露比最低披露標準更豐富的信息以回應市場的需求。

　　一個強有力的、能促進真正信息透明化的信息披露體制是以市場為基礎的公司監(jiān)管體系的重要特征，它對股東能在知情基礎上行使所有權(quán)至關(guān)重要。來自一些擁有大規(guī)模的、活躍的證券市場的國家的經(jīng)驗表明，信息披露可以成為影響公司行為和保護投資者的有效工具。強有力的信息披露體制可以在資本市場中吸引資金并保持投資者的信心。與之相反的，無效的披露體制以及不透明的操作慣例將可能導致缺乏職業(yè)道德的行為，并可能給整個市場帶來巨大損失，這種損失不僅針對某個公司和它的股東，而且將影響整個經(jīng)濟。股東和潛在投資者需要規(guī)范、可靠、可比較的完備的信息，從而了解公司的經(jīng)營管理情況，然后在此基礎上就估值定價、所有權(quán)、選舉權(quán)等問題做出決策。不完備或不明確的信息可能阻礙市場的運行，增加資本成本，并可能導致資源的無效配置。

　　信息披露還能幫助增強公眾對企業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)和行為、對關(guān)乎環(huán)境和道德標準的公司政策，以及對公司及其相關(guān)團體間的關(guān)系的理解。OECD《跨國企業(yè)指引》就與此相關(guān)。

　　對信息披露的要求并不會給企業(yè)帶來管理負擔或增加成本，企業(yè)也不會被要求披露那些危及企業(yè)競爭地位的信息，除非這種披露對提供全面的投資決策的信息是必須的、或披露這些信息可以避免對投資者的誤導。在判斷哪些信息必須披露的問題上，許多國家都采用了重要性的概念。具有重要性的信息可以定義為那些如果遺漏或誤陳則可能影響信息使用者的經(jīng)濟決策的信息。

　　本準則要求企業(yè)及時披露發(fā)生在定期報告之間的重要事項發(fā)展。本準則還要求同時對所有股東發(fā)布信息，以確保股東受到平等對待。企業(yè)在保持與投資者和市場參與者密切關(guān)系的同時，必須不能違背平等對待的基本原則。

　　A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on:

　　披露將包括、但不限制于以下重要信息：

　　1. The financial and operating results of the company. 公司財務和業(yè)績狀況;

　　Audited financial statements showing the financial performance and the financial situation of the company (most typically including the balance sheet, the profit and loss statement, the cash flow statement and notes to the financial statements) are the most widely used source of information on companies. In their current form, the two principal goals of financial statements are to enable appropriate monitoring to take place and to provide the basis to value securities. Management’s discussion and analysis of operation is typically included in annual reports. This discussion is most useful when read in conjunction with the accompanying financial statements. Investors are particularly interested in information that may shed light on the future performance of the enterprise.

　　Arguably, failures of governance can often be linked to the failure to disclose the whole picture, particularly where off-balance sheet items are used to provide guarantees or similar commitments between related companies. It is therefore important that transactions relating to an entire group of companies be disclosed in line with high quality internationally recognized standards and include information about contingent liabilities and off-balance sheet transactions, as well as special purpose entities.

　　審計后的財務報表(一般包括資產(chǎn)負債表、損益表、現(xiàn)金流量表以及財務報表注釋)顯示了公司的財務業(yè)績和財務狀況，是最為廣泛使用的企業(yè)信息來源。就現(xiàn)行的財務報表形式，應用財務報表有兩個主要的目標：一是使開展合理的監(jiān)管成為可能，二是提供證券估價的基礎。經(jīng)營管理層對公司運營情況的討論和分析通常在年報中予以敘述，如果結(jié)合相應的財務報表對此進行分析閱讀，這些信息十分有用。投資者尤其對那些可能預示公司前景的信息感興趣。

　　事實表明，公司治理的失敗通常與披露的信息未能展示企業(yè)全貌有關(guān)，尤其是在用資產(chǎn)負債表外的項目為關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)提供擔?；蝾愃频奈惺马椀那闆r。因此在高質(zhì)量的國際標準下對與整個集團公司相關(guān)的交易情況予以披露十分重要，其中包括披露或有負債、表外交易、特殊利益實體的信息。

　　2. Company objectives公司經(jīng)營目標;

　　In addition to their commercial objectives, companies are encouraged to disclose policies relating to business ethics, the environment and other public policy commitments. Such information may be important for investors and other users of information to better evaluate the relationship between companies and the communities in which they operate and the steps that companies have taken to implement their objectives.

　　除公司的商業(yè)目標以外，公司還被鼓勵披露與商業(yè)道德、環(huán)境及其他與公眾責任相關(guān)的政策。這些信息可能使投資者和其它信息使用者更好的評價公司在為實現(xiàn)經(jīng)營目標所做的努力中與其所在的社會之間的關(guān)系。

　　3. Major share ownership and voting rights主要股權(quán)和投票權(quán);

　　One of the basic rights of investors is to be informed about the ownership structure of the enterprise and their rights vis-à-vis the rights of other owners. The right to such information should also extend to information about the structure of a group of companies and intra-group relations. Such disclosures should make transparent the objectives, nature and structure of the group. Countries often require disclosure of ownership data once certain thresholds of ownership are passed. Such disclosure might include data on major shareholders and others that, directly or indirectly, control or may control the company through special voting rights, shareholder agreements, the ownership of controlling or large blocks of shares, significant cross shareholding relationships and cross guarantees.

　　Particularly for enforcement purposes, and to identify potential conflicts of interest, related party transactions and insider trading, information about beneficial ownership. In cases where major shareholdings are held through intermediary structures or arrangements, information about the beneficial owners should therefore be obtainable at least by regulatory and enforcement agencies and/or through the judicial process. The OECD template Options for Obtaining Beneficial Ownership and Control Information can serve as a useful self-assessment tool for countries that wish to ensure necessary access to information about beneficial ownership.

　　投資者的一項基本權(quán)利是了解公司的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和他們與其他股權(quán)所有者權(quán)利的相對關(guān)系。這項知情權(quán)可以擴展到對一個集團公司結(jié)構(gòu)以及集團內(nèi)部關(guān)系的了解。這些信息的披露可以保證集團的經(jīng)營目標、性質(zhì)和結(jié)構(gòu)透明公開。國家通常規(guī)定在某些所有權(quán)變更時披露所有權(quán)信息，包括披露主要股東及其它對公司有控制力、或可能通過特別投票權(quán)、股東協(xié)議、持有大量股權(quán)、具有重大交叉持股關(guān)系或交叉擔保等方式直接或間接控制公司的股東。

　　為確保投資者的上述權(quán)利，并為發(fā)現(xiàn)潛在的利益沖突及相關(guān)的關(guān)聯(lián)交易和內(nèi)部交易，歷史股權(quán)記錄必須包含由于股權(quán)變更而受益的股權(quán)所有者的信息。對于主要股權(quán)由中介機構(gòu)持有的情況，有關(guān)受益的股權(quán)所有者的信息應該至少可以通過制定規(guī)章的機構(gòu)或執(zhí)行機構(gòu)、或通過評判裁決過程獲取。對于希望獲得受益股權(quán)所有者的信息的國家來說， OECD的格式樣本《獲得有利的所有權(quán)及控制信息的選擇性》是它們進行自我評價的有效工具。

　　4. Remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives, and information about board members, including their qualifications, the selection process, other company directorships and whether they are regarded as independent by the board.

　　Investors require information on individual board members and key executives in order to evaluate their experience and qualifications and assess any potential conflicts of interest that might affect their judgement. For board members, the information should include their qualifications, share ownership in the company, membership of other boards and whether they are considered by the board to be an independent member. It is important to disclose membership of other boards not only because it is an indication of experience and possible time pressures facing a member of the board, but also because it may reveal potential conflicts of interest and makes transparent the degree to which there are inter-locking boards.

　　A number of national principles, and in some cases laws, lay down specific duties for board members who can be regarded as independent and in some instances recommend that a majority of the board should be independent. In many countries, it is incumbent on the board to set out the reasons why a member of the board can be considered independent. It is then up to the shareholders, and ultimately the market, to determine if those reasons are justified. Several countries have concluded that companies should disclose the selection process and especially whether it was open to a broad field of candidates. Such information should be provided in advance of any decision by the general shareholder’s meeting or on a continuing basis if the situation has changed materially.

　　Information about board and executive remuneration is also of concern to shareholders. Of particular interest is the link between remuneration and company performance. Companies are generally expected to disclose information on the remuneration of board members and key executives so that investors can assess the costs and benefits of remuneration plans and the contribution of incentive schemes, such as stock option schemes, to company performance. Disclosure on an individual basis (including termination and retirement provisions) is increasingly regarded as good practice and is now mandated in several countries. In these cases, some jurisdictions call for remuneration of a certain number of the highest paid executives to be disclosed, while in others it is confined to specified positions.

　　對董事會成員和關(guān)鍵經(jīng)營人員的薪酬政策，和董事會成員的信息，包括他們的資格、選擇程序、在其他公司兼任董事情況以及他們是否被董事會確認為獨立董事;

　　投資者需要了解董事會成員和主要經(jīng)營人員的情況，來評估他們的經(jīng)驗、資格并判斷他們之間是否存在潛在的可能影響判斷力的利益沖突。對于董事會成員來說,還應披露他們的資格、在公司的股份、是否兼任其他公司董事以及公司是否確認他們是獨立董事。披露是否兼任其他公司董事是非常重要的，它不僅表明了該董事會成員經(jīng)驗資歷和其安排時間時可能受到的限制，同時也顯示了潛在的利益沖突，以及在何種程度上各公司的董事會間存在關(guān)聯(lián)。

　　一些國家的準則、甚至一些法律，規(guī)定獨立董事承擔特別的義務，還有準則鼓勵大多數(shù)的董事會成員都是獨立董事。在許多國家，董事會負有義務陳述其某位成員可以視為獨立董事的原因，由股東、最終是市場，來判定這些理由是否合理。有些國家認為公司應該披露選舉過程，尤其是這一過程是否面向范圍廣大的候選者。這些信息必須在股東大會做出任何決定之前予以披露，當情況有重要變化時應該追蹤披露。

　　董事會成員和經(jīng)營人員的報酬也是股東關(guān)心的問題，尤其受到關(guān)注的是他們的報酬和公司業(yè)績之間的聯(lián)系。公司一般會披露董事會成員和主要經(jīng)營人員的薪酬信息，這樣投資者可以評判薪酬計劃的成本收益性以及激勵政策，比如期權(quán)計劃、業(yè)績評估。個人情況的披露(包括合約期滿和退休的規(guī)定)正逐漸為公司應用，目前某些國家已對此做出強制性規(guī)定。其中有些要求披露最高級別薪酬的經(jīng)營人員的報酬，另一些則要求披露一些特定職位的報酬。

　　5. Related party transactions關(guān)聯(lián)交易;

　　It is important for the market to know whether the company is being run with due regard to the interests of all its investors. To this end, it is essential for the company to fully disclose material related party transactions to the market, either individually, or on a grouped basis, including whether they have been executed at arms-length and on normal market terms. In a number of jurisdictions this is indeed already a legal requirement. Related parties can include entities that control or are under common control with the company, significant shareholders including members of their families and key management personnel.

　　Transactions involving the major shareholders (or their close family, relations etc.), either directly or indirectly, are potentially the most difficult type of transactions. In some jurisdictions, shareholders above a limit as low as 5 per cent shareholding are obliged to report transactions. Disclosure requirements include the nature of the relationship where control exists and the nature and amount of transactions with related parties, grouped as appropriate. Given the inherent opaqueness of many transactions, the obligation may need to be placed on the beneficiary to inform the board about the transaction, which in turn should make a disclosure to the market. This should not absolve the firm from maintaining its own monitoring, which is an important task for the board.

　　對于市場來說，了解公司在經(jīng)營過程中是否平等對待所有股東的利益很重要。為此公司必須向市場全面披露所有個人性質(zhì)或集團性質(zhì)的關(guān)聯(lián)交易，包括這些交易是以內(nèi)部價格成交還是以一般市場價格為基礎。一些地方甚至將此列為法律規(guī)定。關(guān)聯(lián)方包括對公司達到控制或共同控制的實體、重要股東及其家庭成員以及主要管理人員。

　　涉及主要股東(或其密切的家庭成員)的交易，無論是直接交易還是間接交易，是最難處理的交易類型。一些地方要求持股5%及其以上的股東有義務披露其交易。披露的信息內(nèi)容應該包括控制關(guān)系的性質(zhì)，關(guān)聯(lián)交易及類似交易的性質(zhì)和規(guī)模。由于許多交易的不透明性，可能需要交易的受益方向董事會通告交易，再由董事會向市場披露。董事會的一項重要任務是防止企業(yè)躲避自我監(jiān)督。